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Abstract 
 
There is general concern that producer subsidies distort competition. We examine a 
telecommunications subsidy system that transfers money from low cost regions to high cost 
regions of the U.S. Even though the system is designed to be competitively neutral, we find 
evidence that the system, combined with carrier of last resort policies, promotes cream skimming 
by entrants in low cost areas and less entry in high cost areas, where incumbents are more likely 
than entrants to receive subsidies. We are unable to rule out the possibility that state regulatory 
policies favor incumbents in states that are net beneficiaries of the subsidy system. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Oftentimes governments subsidize production of products or services. European 
governments provide funding for Airbus to develop new aircraft. Farmers regularly are provided 
financial support by national governments. Local governments in the United States frequently 
provide special tax breaks or other financial considerations to help support a local failing 
business or to attract a new business to an area; however, such government subsidies distort 
markets, and distortions ultimately increase costs for consumers. Governments therefore have an 
incentive to try to make such subsidy programs competitively neutral using additional policy 
tools and regulations.  
In this paper we consider the impact of a particular subsidy program to study its effects 
on competition in the sector. We focus specifically on the telecommunications industry’s 
Universal Service Fund (USF) in the United States. This is a particularly interesting situation for 
several reasons. First, industry regulators transformed the program in the 1990s from one 
designed specifically to subsidize local telephone monopolies to one that would be competitively 
neutral; however, there is concern among some state telecommunications regulators that the 
subsidy program unnecessarily and heavily taxes some states (and not others) to provide these 
subsidies. In other words, competition still is presumed to be distorted. Second, the fund more 
than doubled in size from 1999 to 2005 – from $1.7 billion to $3.8 billion1 – raising the 
possibility that any market distortions caused by the subsidy may have grown as well. Finally, 
the USF has continued to grow and the possibility of its expansion to include broadband services 
is real. 
Using county level telecommunications and demographic data from 1999 through 2002, 
we consider the high cost support subsidy within the USF program. We find that the high cost 
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support subsidy has effects that run counter to the intended purposes of the fund. Specifically, we 
find that despite efforts to create a competitively neutral telecommunications support 
mechanism, the scheme interacts with another regulatory mechanism, the carrier of last resort 
policy, to distort competition. This occurs because the carrier of last resort policy requires 
incumbents to serve all customers in broad geographic areas. Entrants, on the other hand, may 
choose to serve any subset of customers. Ultimately entrants choose to operate in only the most 
profitable geographic areas.2 Thus, the carrier of last resort policy opens the door for cream 
skimming by entrants, and the high cost support mechanism exacerbates the problem by 
requiring incumbents to pay a portion of their revenues into the high cost fund, which is then 
used to subsidize telecommunications providers in high cost areas. Although entrants pay into 
the high cost fund as well, we find that the effects of the policies together are not competitively 
neutral between incumbents and entrants.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information and indicates 
how our research contributes to the existing literature addressing universal service subsidies. 
Section 3 presents our hypotheses and theoretical model of the effect of high cost support on 
telecommunications competition. Section 4 presents the data and empirical methodology. The 
results and policy discussion are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Universal service and high cost support 
The stated purposes of the U.S. Communications Act of 1934 included “regulating 
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so 
far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and 
worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
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charges.”3 This goal is now commonly referred to as universal service, but subsidies for 
universal service are a much more recent invention. Indeed the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) did not adopt a policy of telecommunications subsidies until the late 1960s, 
and it wasn’t until the late 1960s and the 1970s – by which time telephone service was already 
available throughout the country – that the FCC adopted extensive subsidies for rural, high cost 
telecommunications companies.4  
The original telephone subsidy policy that the FCC embraced and then extended came 
under pressure in 1984, as the AT&T monopoly was divided into smaller “Baby-Bells” and 
competition in long-distance telephone service commenced. The FCC’s response to such 
competition was to create a universal service fund to replace the implicit subsidy system that had 
been achieved through the regulation of the AT&T monopoly. The new fund assessed 
competitive interstate long distance carriers to support local telephone monopolies that were 
required to maintain low prices to promote universal service. The fund allowed special 
considerations for small companies serving in high cost areas, and helped to provide price 
discounts to low income consumers. 
Then in 1996, the Telecommunications Act opened competition in local markets. This 
meant that assessing competitive interstate long distance carriers to support local telephone 
companies (no longer monopolies) could distort market competition. However, the Act preserved 
the subsidies and extended the dissemination of funds collected to include schools, libraries, and 
rural health care providers. To address each of these interests the FCC and state utility regulators 
created a single federal Universal Service Fund (USF) composed of four programs: 1) high cost 
support; 2) Lifeline and Linkup; 3) schools and libraries; and 4) rural health.  The focus of our 
research is high cost support.  
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandated that incumbents and entrants contribute 
a fixed percentage of their interstate and international revenues to the USF, and industry 
regulators believed that providing USF money to all eligible telecommunications carriers 
operating in high cost areas could promote efficient competition. By treating incumbents and 
entrants the same with respect to the USF, the subsidy system should not distort competition. 
Still, the fund was designed so that while incumbents automatically qualified for high cost 
support, entrants were required to apply and demonstrate eligibility.5 Consequently, during the 
period of our study, few entrants qualified for high cost support. 
The USF is now a massive national program under the jurisdiction of the FCC. It 
disbursed approximately $7.3 billion in 2005, $4.2 billion of which was used to support 
companies operating in high cost service areas.6 The high cost support proportion of total USF 
support has grown in recent years, from 47% in 1998 to 58% in 2005.  
As the size of the program has grown, the USF has been increasingly criticized by 
regulators as well as scholars. In recent years one issue of contention is that the USF, presumed 
to be a competitively neutral national program, allows the volume of contributions to the USF 
and receipts from the USF to vary across states, resulting in each state having either a net deficit 
or net surplus of USF contributions. States with telecommunications companies that contribute 
significantly to the fund but collect little from it are concerned that such revenue outflows 
constitute inefficient subsidies and hamper telecommunications development within their states. 
Some of these states advocate reducing the size of the federal program and promoting state-
administered USF programs where fewer contributions would be sent out of state (Clark, 2005). 
Naturally, states that are net recipients of USF funding are against such proposals. 
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Table 1 shows the overall net USF contributions ranked across the 50 U.S. states and the 
District of Columbia.7 States with high net contributions to the USF, such as California, New 
York, Florida, and New Jersey, have voiced concern that they contribute much more to the USF 
than they receive from it, allowing states such as Alaska, Kansas, Arkansas, and Mississippi to 
receive significant net receipts from the USF. While states with large landmass, low population 
density, and challenging terrain tend to have relatively more high cost areas, these characteristics 
do not necessarily predict the overall level of USF net contributions for the state. For example, 
the extent to which the population is clustered into metropolitan areas (as in the top net 
contributor states) rather than being spread across many small cities (as in the top net recipient 
states), is a more accurate indicator of whether a state is a net contributor to or net recipient of 
the USF.8 Of further interest is the large difference between net contributor states and net 
recipient states when comparing the average net contribution by local loop,9 as shown in Figure 
1. In 2004, net contributor states contributed at most $20.56 per local loop (on average), while 
net recipient states received as much as $182.41 dollars per local loop (on average). Clearly 
population density, as reflected by the number of local loops, is a critical indicator of net 
contributions.  
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
Literature addressing the USF generally has been critical of the welfare benefit of the 
fund to society. Wolak (1996) and Barros et. al. (1999) show that wireline telecommunications 
penetration rates in the U.S., even in many rural areas, was approaching 100% when their articles 
were written; further, they cite evidence that few residents would disconnect service as a result of 
moderately rising prices. Garbacz and Thompson (2002, 2003) support these conclusions, 
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showing demand for telecommunications services to be highly inelastic. These studies indicate 
that the majority of the population has access to telecommunications services and chooses to 
subscribe to such services. Thus, the main impetus for the USF (to ensure affordable 
telecommunications services for the entire population) appears irrelevant.  
Specifically addressing high cost support, Rosston and Wimmer (2000) argue that 
subsidies for high cost areas are inherently discriminatory. High cost areas (in terms of 
telecommunications provision) can include wealthy estates and remote vacation or secondary 
homes, while low cost areas are generally more urban and therefore may have a greater number 
of low income households. In such cases, the high cost fund subsidizes the wealthy rather than 
low-income households for whom the USF was primarily intended. Rosston and Wimmer argue 
that reducing high cost support would have no significant effect on universal service, while 
higher taxes needed to fund the program create costly distortions. Similarly, Cremer et al. (2001) 
and Chiang and Hada (2007) show that unbalanced rate structures whereby telecommunications 
prices do not closely reflect their costs cause a costly redistribution of welfare from one segment 
of the population to another. Eriksson et al. (1998) compare the effectiveness of untargeted 
subsidies such as the high cost fund and more targeted subsidies such as the Lifeline and Linkup 
(low income) programs, and find that the latter are significantly more effective in increasing 
telephone subscriptions. Further, they show that the costs of funding any of these subsidies 
significantly offset the positive benefits that both untargeted and targeted subsidies aim to 
achieve. Lastly, Cremer et al. (2001) argues that high cost support is inefficient when the 
incumbent is not the most efficient operator. In this case, efficient competitors in effect support a 
less efficient incumbent. 
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One drawback of the existing literature is that most studies measure the effects of 
consumer well-being using the level of telephone penetration (i.e., the proportion of total 
households with access to telecommunications service, or the number of access lines). Yet, with 
wireline penetration rates about 93%10 and with increasingly more U.S. households choosing to 
substitute mobile phones (and more recently, Internet-based telephony) for wireline phones, the 
use of penetration rate data is no longer an effective means of measuring consumer well-being. 
Hazlett (2006) points out that while almost all U.S. households have access to a wireline 
provider, as of the start of 2006, only approximately 89% actually paid to subscribe to wireline 
service. This may be due to the availability of wireless substitutes that now reach over 95% of 
U.S. households. In this paper, we measure consumer well-being by the level of wireline 
telecommunications provider entry as a proxy for competition. We further account for wireless 
penetration so that any increase in telecommunications services overall is captured within our 
model. 
In this paper, we study how states’ net outflows of USF high cost support contributions 
affect competition. Based on the current national approach to administering the high cost support 
fund, we estimate the effect of net contributions on competition in a state by analyzing entry data 
at the county, study area, and state levels for all U.S. states and the District of Columbia for the 
four-year period from 1999 through 2002.11 To our knowledge, this research is the first to 
empirically analyze cross-state effects of high cost support net contributions on the overall level 
of competition within a state. This is an important issue for policymakers who argue that positive 
net contributions to the high cost support fund are deleterious to a state’s ability to sustain 
efficient competition. Our main hypotheses follow.  
 
3.  Hypotheses and theoretical motivation 
Consider an incumbent telecommunications provider that is a net contributor into the 
high cost fund. Assume the incumbent has both high cost and low cost areas within its study 
area. Low cost areas are generally urban areas with high customer density and/or relatively easy 
terrain in which to locate telephone lines. High cost areas are generally rural and sparsely 
populated, and/or have more challenging terrain. Consider that the incumbent must serve any 
customer within its study area who requests service. Its rivals do not have to serve the entire 
study area. 
Let A represent the incumbent’s average, per customer cost for providing service in the 
study area.12 The study area has both high cost and low cost areas. Assume the incumbent’s 
prices to its customers reflect the average cost of providing service in the study area. This 
practice is called rate averaging and is the traditional pricing practice of regulated utilities. Let L 
where L < A represent an entrant’s cost for serving a customer in a low cost area of the study 
area. Research indicates entrants typically serve such low cost areas (Hauge et al., 2005). 
Assume that all else equal, customers prefer lower prices to higher prices, so the market share 
that the entrant gains in the low cost area is greater the lower its prices are relative to the prices 
of the incumbent. In other words, assuming that prices reflect underlying costs, the entrant’s 
market share in the low cost area is increasing in LA − . 
Now consider the effect of a high cost subsidy system that is funded by a fee assessed 
against all telecommunications providers (incumbents and entrants) based on a percentage of 
each firm’s revenue.13 Let α  represent the percent of revenue each provider must contribute to 
the high cost fund, where 0>1 > α . The incumbent, in order to pay the fee and cover its costs, 
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must charge a customer at least α−1
A . The entrant must charge at least α−1
L . The result is that 
with the subsidy, the entrant’s increase in market share is greater than without the subsidy. As 
Zolnierek et al (2001), Roycroft (2005), and Jamison (2004) show, the more profitable a market 
is for entrants, the greater the entry in the market. 
Now consider a study area that is a net recipient of the high cost fund. This means that 
the study area has relatively greater area that is high cost than low cost within its boundaries. The 
incumbent provider is entitled to receive high cost funds for its service within the study area. 
Qualifying entrants also are entitled to such funds for their service. However, during the period 
of our study, few entrants had qualified to receive high cost support. The discrepancy makes it 
possible for incumbents in net recipient study areas to obtain a cost advantage over entrants. 
Such a case would occur if the subsidy Ŝ, where Ŝ ∈ [S,S], allows A - Ŝ < L. This would lower 
entrants’ profitability and in theory lead to less entry.14 This leads to our first hypothesis, 
namely: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Under high cost support, competition as measured through entry will be lower in 
net recipient study areas relative to net contributor study areas. 
 
If we fail to reject Hypothesis 1, we cannot conclude that the fund distorts competition. 
Net contributor study areas have by definition fewer high cost areas and more low cost areas. 
Given that most entrants prefer low cost areas, all else equal, we expect more entry in net 
contributor study areas than in net recipient study areas. 
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However, we assert that one goal of the subsidy is to make high cost areas more 
commercially viable so that competition in high cost areas would be equivalent to competition in 
low cost areas of otherwise similar type. In other words, we should find equivalent entry across 
study areas of inherently different cost structures but with similar demand and demographic 
characteristics. We propose two possible reasons equivalent entry might not occur: the structure 
of the USF program may be flawed, or state regulatory policies that impact the decision-making 
processes and profitability of both incumbent and new telecommunications providers may 
disrupt competition. This leads to our second hypothesis, namely: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  States that are net contributors to high cost support adopt regulatory policies that 
encourage competition relative to the regulatory policies of states that are net recipients.  
 
Regulatory policies in states that are net contributors to high cost support may (through a 
variety of intentional or unintentional means) facilitate more agreeable interconnection 
agreements with incumbents or may adopt policies that encourage entrants to lease essential 
facilities from incumbents. Additionally, they may have less stringent requirements for entrants 
to become classified as providers eligible to receive USF money for operating in high cost areas. 
To determine whether this is the case, we broaden our analysis to consider whether a state being 
a net recipient or net contributor affects entry in that state. 
We reject our second hypothesis if we find that states’ regulatory characteristics and 
policies are not significant determinants of entry. Additionally, we reject the hypothesis if a 
state’s status of being a net contributor is significantly and negatively correlated with entry. If we 
fail to reject our first hypothesis (i.e., we find that entry is relatively lower in net recipient study 
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areas), but do reject our second hypothesis (entry is not related to state regulatory 
characteristics), we can conclude that the high cost fund directly distorts competition. 
 
4.  Data and empirical methodology 
4.1. Dependent variable 
We use a dataset that includes all entrants in the U.S. telecommunications market by city 
over the four-year period from 1999 through 2002. In the absence of any market distortions, we 
expect greater customer demand, lower provider costs, and pro-entrant regulatory policies to 
result in greater entry into a market. Given our goal of estimating the effect of high cost support 
contributions on entry, our empirical models use the total number of providers per county (and 
per study area) as dependent variables.15 Provider data is from the annual CLEC Reports from 
New Paradigm Resources Group, Inc., and includes both planned and operational voice and data 
network services provided by entrants. We also include services supplied by municipal providers 
such as those used for the city’s own operations (meter reading, municipal data network, 
supervisory control and data acquisition, and voice) and those provided to others (cable 
television, long distance telephone, Internet access, broadband, fiber leasing, and local 
telephone). Municipal provider data is from the American Public Power Association. Note that 
while our data includes the existence of entrants by city by year, because our demographic 
variables are at the county level, we aggregate our city level data to the county level and control 
for the number of cities per county and the total population.  
We also estimate the effect of entry by study area because receipt of high cost support (as 
well as contributions) is determined by study area. For study area estimates, we match the county 
level data to study areas. Using detailed incumbent maps from all 50 states and the District of 
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Columbia, we map each county to the single largest study area within the county borders.16 For 
the vast majority of counties, a single study area dominated the county. For the remaining 
counties, the study area representing the county was selected by either having the greatest 
physical area in the county or by the number of loops the designated incumbent served within the 
county. The latter criterion was used to map most of the remaining counties.17 This gives us a 
total of 12,536 observations (3,134 observations per year for four years), and represents 99.8 
percent of all counties in the U.S. In only 7 counties nationwide were we unable to map a county 
to a study area due to incomplete data. 
4.2. Explanatory Variables 
Our explanatory variables can be divided into three categories: costs of operating and the 
competitive environment; demographic indicators of demand; and regulatory characteristics. We 
include in our model those factors that have been found to be relevant determinants of entry into 
local telecommunications markets by prior studies (for example by Alexander and Feinberg, 
2004; Greenstein and Mazzeo, 2006; Roycroft, 2005; and Zolnierek et al, 2001). Of primary 
interest for our analysis are net contributions to the USF. These additional costs of operating are 
measured in two ways: aggregate net contributions by county and study area (Net Contributions) 
and average net contributions per loop by county and study area (Net Contributions per Loop).18 
These variables serve as the key explanatory variables in our regression analyses to estimate the 
effects of the USF on competitive entry.19 
To represent the competitive environment we include indicators for incumbents. We do 
this using state level variables that control for the leading incumbent serving each county and 
study area. These variables are named for the respective incumbent; for example, the percentage 
of telecommunications revenue in a state that is attributed to Qwest in a particular year is 
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included as a variable (Qwest) in all observations where Qwest has a presence in a state. 
Additionally, we account for incumbents’ direct effects on rivals through unbundled network 
elements (UNEs). Regulators require incumbents to provide UNEs to rivals.20 If an incumbent 
finds it more profitable to provide retail services than to provide unbundled network elements, 
we would expect the incumbent to try to limit entry. Thus, if incumbents are able to affect entry, 
we would expect a positive relationship between entrant presence in a market and the ratio of 
prices of unbundled network elements (UNEs) and comparable retail services. To capture this 
effect, we include as a variable the incumbent’s average price for UNEs per line divided by the 
comparable retail price per line (Average UNE Rate). Following Jamison (2004) we expect this 
variable to capture the potentially conflicting effects of regulation on incumbent and entrant 
incentives. We expect service provider costs generally to fall with the amount of urbanization or 
population density and choose to measure this as population per square mile (Population). 
Lastly, we include the number of cellular telephone providers per county per year (Cellular 
Carriers) to account for the possible substitution effect that may decrease demand for wireline 
telephone service when more wireless providers are available. 
With respect to our second category of variables, demographic indicators of demand, we 
use those variables that prior studies estimating demand have generally found to be significant.21 
We expect demand to be positively related to household income, and measure this effect using 
the median annual household income within the county and study area (Median Household 
Income). We also include the percentage of the population that receives government assistance 
(Assistance) and anticipate this to be inversely related to demand. Finally, we include the median 
age of the population in the county and study area (Median Age). While we do not have a strong 
prediction on the effect of age on competitive entry, a study by Chiang and Hada (2007) showed 
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that younger consumers tend to value choices in providers more than older consumers. If this is 
accurate, we would predict greater entry in counties with a lower median age.22  
With respect to the final category of variables, the regulatory environment, we include 
three variables to estimate the effect of state regulatory conditions on competition. First, we 
include the binary variable Flexible Regulation (with the excluded category all other types of 
regulation) to distinguish between states that do and do not impose price floors on entrants. 
Because the imposition of price floors restricts the ability for entrants to compete on price, we 
expect states that do not impose such restrictions to attract greater entry, and therefore we expect 
a positive correlation between Flexible Regulation and the presence of entrants in a market. 
Second, we measure whether public service commissioners are appointed rather than elected 
with the binary variable PSC Appointed. We do not have an a priori prediction on the possible 
effects of public service commissioners being appointed rather than elected. It is possible that 
elected commissioners are more responsive to immediate citizen concerns, but it is unclear 
whether this means that the commissioners might favor entrants, incumbents, or neither.23 Lastly, 
we include a variable that indicates whether a particular state has imposed restrictions on 
municipal telecommunications entry (Municipal Ban). While municipal entry is a small subset of 
total entry, those states with regulations limiting such entry may have motivations for doing so 
that also discourage entry by non-municipal entrants.  
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
Our empirical model is based on the theoretical model outlined in Section 3 above. We 
examine two dependent variables, the number of providers per county, and the number of 
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providers per study area. Our primary interest is to determine whether net contributions to the 
USF affect entry; however, it is clear that similar factors affect both an entrant’s decision to 
provide telecommunications services in a particular market and the net contributions that 
ultimately accrue to (or are received from) that market. Therefore, our data is likely to be 
characterized by endogeneity of the key regressor Net Contributions (and Net Contributions per 
Loop). The standard tests for endogenous variables support our concern. By the Wu-Hausman F-
test we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the regressor Net Contributions is endogenous (P-
value = 0.00137). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test has a similar result (P-value = 0.00136). 
To address this correlation, we employ a two-stage least squares estimation in which we use 
average revenue per line lagged one year as the instrumental variable for Net Contributions. The 
set of independent variables is as listed in Table 2, and models are specified for dependent 
variables Entrants per County and Entrants per Study Area both with and without identifying the 
primary incumbent provider. Additionally, in order to tie the results of the county level 
estimations to the state level policy analysis this paper addresses, we test simply for the 
significance of states being net contributors to the USF (Net Positive) versus being net recipients 
of the USF. We consider the variable Net Positive at all three levels of observation: county, study 
area, and state. The results of these estimations appear in Table 3 and are discussed in the next 
section.  
 
5.  Results 
The county level and study area level estimates are presented in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
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We segmented our results to take into account both entrants per county and entrants per 
study area in order to capture any significant differences since our primary variable of interest 
(Net Contributions) is determined at the study area level. While we address the specifications 
separately it is important to note that both Net Contributions and Net Contributions per Loop are 
positively and statistically significant across all specifications. Using the estimation coefficients 
in Column 1 of Table 3, the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in Net 
Contributions ($6.51 million) is associated with an increase of 0.06 entrants per county, an 
increase of nearly 8% from the mean. Thus, our first hypothesis is supported in that we find net 
contributions to correspond with greater entry, while net receipts correspond with less entry. As 
discussed earlier, this is precisely the pattern of entry we would expect to observe in the absence 
of the USF. Of interest is to discern why we continue to observe this pattern in the presence of 
the USF. Prior to addressing this question, we first consider the remaining explanatory variables 
within the county level specifications.  
Across the county level specifications we find that the variables controlling for the 
incumbent’s share of total state revenue are consistently significant indicating that entry is highly 
influenced by the leading incumbent in a market. Entry in general is higher among all counties 
where Sprint24 is the leading incumbent, and lower among counties where Alltel is the leading 
incumbent. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine why various incumbents have 
different effects on entry; we suspect it is related to corporate strategies and other firm-specific 
variables that are not captured in our model. Consistent with our expectations, we find that 
Average UNE Rate is positively and significantly correlated with entry. This finding suggests 
that incumbents that can earn higher revenue by leasing their unbundled network elements are 
less likely to act to limit entry, as the relative gains from serving retail customers are less 
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important. Our variable Cellular Carriers has the expected negative sign, which supports our 
assertion that the availability of wireless substitutes should decrease entry as overall demand for 
wireline services decline. Finally, we find Population to be positively and significantly 
correlated with entry, as expected.  
With respect to our second category of variables (indicators of demand), we find Median 
Household Income to be positively and significantly correlated with entry. Median Age is 
negatively correlated with entry, which supports the notion that younger consumers place higher 
value in advanced technologies and the availability of new and improved products that result 
from competition than older consumers. Additionally, the percentage of the population receiving 
government assistance (Assistance) is positively and significantly correlated with entry. We 
expect that this variable reflects a higher level of urbanization where a greater number of lower-
income households may reside. 
With respect to the final category of variables, the regulatory environment, we find that 
Flexible Regulation is associated with lower likelihood of the presence of entrants in a market. It 
is possible that this result, which is counter to our initial expectation, reflects a response by 
regulators to satisfy incumbents by incorporating other rules that might deter competitive entry. 
We find that whether the public service commissioners are appointed or elected is not 
significant, nor is the presence of restrictions on municipal entry. We conclude then with respect 
to our second hypothesis that state regulatory policy does not appear to drive our results. 
Turning to the study area level results presented in Table 3, note that the same 
estimations were performed after aggregating the county level variables to the corresponding 
study area. While the majority of results are qualitatively similar to the county level 
specifications, coefficients for key variables are strengthened, including those for Net 
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Contributions and Average UNE Rate. Note that the variables controlling for incumbent’s share 
of total state revenue all are insignificant, which is likely due to the study area level specification 
(in which each study area represents just one incumbent). Similarly, Flexible Regulation is not 
significant in the study area estimates.  
The results of the initial estimates as presented above provide us with the foundation for 
testing our first hypothesis. Namely, we find that certain cost, environment, demographic, and 
regulatory factors are relevant to entry decisions. Some of these factors differ by county (i.e., 
population); some differ by state (i.e., election of public utility commissioners); still others differ 
by study area (i.e., incumbent status). Our goal, however, is to determine which of these effects 
most directly drive our results. Our primary concern is how Net Contributions affect the 
competitive environment. Therefore, we attempt to further clarify the effect of USF contributions 
on entry between net contributors and net recipients through the indicator variable Net Positive. 
Net Positive takes the value of 1 if the area (county, study area or state) is a net contributor to the 
high cost fund, and 0 otherwise. The results of these estimates appear in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
Our county level estimates are inconclusive. At the county level, the average number of 
entrants is 1.203 in counties that are net contributors to the fund and 1.740 in counties that are 
net recipients of the fund. This is not a statistically significant difference. We assert that this 
result is due to the large number of counties without any entrants during the years of study. Of 
12,536 total observations, only 2,028 had entry and of those counties, 1,697 were net 
contributors (average entry 5.56 per county) and 331 were net recipients (average entry 2.46 per 
county). Overall among those counties with any entrants during the years of the study, the 
average number of entrants per county was 5.05. To account for these characteristics of the data, 
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we estimated the county level specifications using those counties that had a positive number of 
entrants per county during any of the years of the study. Even doing so, these results were not 
significant. We believe this supports the dominance of study area level and state level results. 
We would expect that to the extent the USF influences policies and decisions, it would do so at 
the study area or state level since funds are determined at the study area level. The county level 
effects that we expect to be the greatest are those indicating the demographic (demand) 
conditions. Our estimations support these assertions. 
With respect to the study area level results, we find that net contributions are positively 
and significantly correlated with the number of entrants. To add clarity to this finding, note that 
the average number of entrants is 22.40 in net contributor study areas and 0.15 in net recipient 
study areas. Similar to our findings with respect to counties, a substantial number of study areas 
had no entrant participation. Therefore, it is useful to compare study areas that have at least one 
entrant. In such cases there are 281 net contributor study areas with an average of 33.57 entrants, 
and 199 net recipient study areas with an average of 4.10 entrants.  
This result also applies at the state level, where in fact we find a positive and statistically 
significant difference in entry between states that are net contributors to the USF and states that 
are net recipients of the USF. Specifically, the average number of entrants is 52.19 in net 
contributor states and 47.94 in net recipient states. Our results indicate a statistically significant, 
positive relationship at the state level between entry and whether a state is a net contributor to the 
USF. 
 
6.  The effects of net contributions on competition 
 
There are at least two potential negative effects on competition created by the high cost 
support. First, entrants are negatively affected by their contributions paid to the USF given that 
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they qualify for the subsidy less frequently than do incumbents. The more significant issue, 
however, is whether the fund distorts competition. In other words, is efficient entry discouraged 
by the high cost system? We assert that this is the case. While contributions to the USF affect the 
profitability of all operators, it is the USF funding system that gives entrants a possible 
advantage over an incumbent when the incumbent is a net contributor. Because an incumbent is 
forced to serve the high cost areas it is unable to effectively compete in the low cost areas. 
Instead, it earns revenue based on its average cost of providing service, which allows prices to be 
higher in the low cost study areas thereby encouraging inefficient entry. The more low cost areas 
a state has, the more disadvantaged the incumbents are expected to be. Simultaneously, states 
with many high cost areas have less entry due simply to costs, and we find that being a net 
recipient of USF subsidies does not encourage efficient entry. In fact, contrary to the intentions 
of policymakers, being a net recipient might discourage efficient competition. 
For future work, relevant questions remain. First, how might entrants respond if the USF 
were abolished altogether? In this case, we would be interested in the level of entry that would 
occur relative to the level of entry in net contributing states under the USF. Alternatively, how 
might entrants response if a state-administered USF were implemented? We also might consider 
the role of specific incumbents on entry. This would require incorporating firm-specific data on 
pricing, policies, and costs. Despite these lingering questions, our key finding remains that 
increased entry is correlated with positive net USF contributions – precisely the result we expect 
to see in the absence of the USF but not in its presence. This adds a new dimension to the 
ongoing debate. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. Figures provided by the Federal Communications Commission (http://www.fcc.gov). 
 
2. The term incumbent refers to the carrier that prior to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
provided local telephone service in an area. An entrant is a carrier that provides some or all of 
the local telephone service in an area that was not operating prior to the Act.  
 
3. Communications Act of 1934, obtained from the University of Southern California website 
http://www.usc.edu/~douglast/202/lecture20/1934act.html, downloaded March 3, 2007. 
 
4. For detailed information on the establishment and progression of the universal service fund, 
see Gabel (1967), Mueller (1993), and Jamison (2002).  
 
5. An entrant must first be designated as a competitive eligible telecommunications carrier before 
qualifying for high cost support. 
 
6. The remainder was disbursed for telecommunications assistance to low income households, 
schools and libraries, and rural health centers. 
 
7. Table 1 uses 2004 contribution data.  
 
8. Formally, a high cost area is defined by the local loop price with respect to the national 
average loop price. The local loop price is the price an entrant must pay the incumbent provider 
to lease the line needed to provide service to the consumer. 
 
9.  A loop is essentially a local telephone line. 
 
10. Subscribership has fallen due to cell phones, but this does not affect wireline penetration, 
which is the ability to subscribe. This is clarified by the Hazlett (2006) reference. 
 
11. A study area is an area defined by the FCC, that represents the geographic area within a state 
that was traditionally served by a particular incumbent. Incumbents that operate in more than one 
state will have a distinct study area for each state in which they operate. In some instances an 
incumbent may have more than one study area in a state if, for example, the company merged 
with another company in the state. Study areas cannot overlap, though more than one study area 
can appear in a single county. 
 
12. The cost of operating in an area is based on a forward-looking cost model of building and 
operating the network. 
 
13. Per the current USF arrangement, contributions are collected from all telecommunications 
carriers providing interstate service. There is a universal service exception for de minimis (non-
common carrier) telecommunications carriers whose estimated contributions would be less than 
$10,000. All carriers that provide service in rural or urban high cost areas receive support. This 
includes entrants that are designated as a competitive eligible telecommunications carrier. A 
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rural area is primarily defined as a study area in which less than 15 percent of access lines are in 
cities of more than 50,000 (http://www.fcc.gov). High cost areas are defined with respect to the 
five components of high cost services, and are based on costs greater than 135% of the national 
average cost per line ($27.51 in 2002). For defined high cost areas with fewer than 200,000 
working loops, the carrier receives $1 in subsidies for each $1 of loop costs above 150 percent of 
the national average loop cost. For defined high cost areas with more than 200,000 working 
loops, the carrier receives subsidies between 10 percent and 75 percent of costs, depending on 
how much the cost is above the national average. 
 
14. The theoretical motivation is shown formally in the Appendix.  
 
15. Our initial research included using the number of access lines as a dependent variable to 
measure investment. These specifications resulted in poor models with insignificant results. We 
submit that this is due to the fact that access lines are frequently leased by entrants; therefore it is 
possible to have entry of one or more entrants without any increase in access lines at all.  
 
16. Incumbent maps were obtained from each state for which a map was available. In six states, 
incumbent maps were not necessary since only one incumbent serves the entire state. In three 
other states, complete incumbent listings by county were obtained in lieu of maps. Maps were 
provided by the Telephone Association or the Public Service Commission from each state. 
Specific documentation of sources is available upon request. 
 
17. The first criterion was used in cases in which two or more study areas were served by large 
incumbents (e.g., SBC and Verizon). This is because it is not possible to determine the number 
of loops an incumbent serves within a county when it serves multiple counties in a state.  
 
18. At the state level, a comparison of these variables in 2004 appears in Table 1 and Figure 1, 
respectively. 
 
19. While the FCC makes available data on receipts from the USF (and specifically on high cost 
support), contributions to the USF are not directly provided. However, contributions can be 
calculated by multiplying the appropriate contribution factor (fixed across all states) by the 
respective time period’s revenues for each state. Contribution factors change each quarter; thus, 
contributions must be calculated on a quarterly basis, and then summed for the annual totals. 
Next, these contributions include funding for all four USF programs. In order to narrow the 
contributions to the high cost portion, all of the contributions are multiplied by the percentage of 
total contributions appropriated to high cost support. This varies from year to year, and ranges 
from 53% to 58%. Receipts are then subtracted from contributions to calculate net contributions. 
 
20. Leasing portions of an incumbent’s network is called purchasing unbundled network 
elements. For example, an entrant could lease a local telephone line from the incumbent 
provider. The line would connect to the incumbent’s building. It could then connect to the 
incumbent’s switch or the entrant’s switch, depending on how the entrant wishes to use the 
incumbent’s facilities. Our variable is a state-wide average rate based on the loop, port and 
switching rates per month. 
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21. Because penetration rates for telecommunications services are high within the U.S., it is 
difficult to predict the factors that potential competitors would consider when deciding if there is 
enough demand to support their entry. For more detailed consideration, see Garbacz and 
Thompson (2002 and 2003), and Grzybowski (2005), or Alexander and Feinberg (2004) who 
provide a review of telecommunications entry literature.  
 
22. We considered additional population characteristics such as race and ethnicity, language, and 
education, and other measures of population density such as urban classification, and various 
demographic indicators such as the employment growth rate and personal bankruptcy rate. These 
variables proved to be insignificant and did not affect results, therefore they were excluded from 
the model. 
 
23. We generically refer to state regulatory agencies as public service commissions. Some states 
elect their commissioners. In other states they are appointed. The appointment processes vary 
across states, but the processes generally involve both the governor and the legislatures. 
 
24.  The incumbent local exchange company Sprint became Embarq subsequent to this study. 
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Table 1. Rank of net contributions into the Universal Service Fund, by state 
Rank State 2004 Net 2003 Net 2002 Net 2001 Net 
1 California $266,002 $245,677 $211,070 $161,039 
2 New York $170,352 $155,401 $136,693 $110,964 
3 Florida $142,908 $132,688 $104,909 $83,115 
4 New Jersey $125,693 $117,060 $116,018 $99,130 
5 Pennsylvania $87,788 $78,072 $73,295 $69,462 
6 Illinois $83,183 $71,868 $75,951 $72,009 
7 Massachusetts $80,355 $75,113 $73,991 $67,425 
8 Ohio $77,174 $69,475 $62,861 $56,913 
9 Maryland $73,800 $68,214 $61,806 $52,470 
10 Michigan $50,130 $47,480 $38,452 $30,459 
11 Connecticut $49,234 $45,855 $42,682 $38,238 
12 North Carolina $22,976 $23,767 $23,228 $32,827 
13 Virginia $22,394 $18,321 $17,179 $12,059 
14 D. Columbia $16,900 $15,801 $15,322 $14,149 
15 Delaware $12,233 $11,365 $10,875 $9,406 
16 Rhode Island $12,052 $11,274 $11,232 $10,678 
17 Tennessee $9,440 $7,628 $4,943 $5,991 
18 Indiana $8,633 $6,144 $7,484 $4,052 
19 New Hampshire $6,390 $5,651 $5,677 $6,222 
20 Nevada $5,855 $1,569 $3,339 $658 
21 Utah $2,440 -$586 $3,081 $4,954 
22 Hawaii $1,953 $3,945 $3,554 $4,511 
23 Georgia -$3,269 -$9,524 -$19,051 -$9,633 
24 Texas -$9,538 -$5,860 -$20,889 -$27,264 
25 Arizona -$13,096 -$7,102 -$4,941 -$391 
26 Washington -$15,024 -$10,684 -$19,451 -$21,216 
27 Maine -$15,404 -$15,942 -$16,438 -$16,952 
28 Colorado -$21,074 -$17,253 -$9,898 -$11,982 
29 Vermont -$22,752 -$19,900 -$17,960 -$15,709 
30 Missouri -$24,019 -$30,386 -$33,291 -$37,460 
31 South Carolina -$26,801 -$33,467 -$35,846 -$19,688 
32 Nebraska -$27,278 -$25,885 -$15,198 -$11,202 
33 New Mexico -$28,231 -$29,280 -$26,429 -$26,675 
34 Oregon -$29,126 -$31,228 -$30,750 -$27,802 
35 Kentucky -$30,018 -$21,432 -$20,843 -$3,015 
36 Idaho -$37,183 -$36,187 -$34,624 -$30,612 
37 Minnesota -$40,146 -$28,919 -$23,322 -$7,202 
38 Wisconsin -$46,417 -$37,623 -$22,112 -$20,117 
39 West Virginia -$46,900 -$58,322 -$63,568 -$57,682 
40 North Dakota -$47,132 -$43,850 -$26,466 -$20,488 
41 Wyoming -$48,060 -$41,090 -$35,366 -$30,196 
42 South Dakota -$48,253 -$40,823 -$25,663 -$16,473 
43 Iowa -$49,541 -$40,239 -$15,744 -$12,155 
44 Alabama -$50,456 -$46,404 -$57,792 -$61,119 
45 Louisiana -$57,706 -$47,250 -$48,967 -$46,735 
46 Montana -$62,850 -$54,872 -$53,437 -$43,073 
47 Oklahoma -$63,913 -$70,645 -$56,037 -$50,272 
48 Alaska -$84,716 -$80,099 -$73,278 -$71,528 
49 Kansas -$97,509 -$83,112 -$67,221 -$57,763 
50 Arkansas -$107,380 -$86,135 -$69,254 -$57,959 
51 Mississippi -$157,193 -$142,470 -$144,482 -$120,223 
Note: Monetary figures represent thousands of U.S. Dollars 
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Table 2. Summary statistics, by county (1999 – 2002); 12,536 observations 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of Entrants per County 
(actual numbers) 
 
0.818 
 
3.561 
 
0 
 
80 
Net Contributions 
(in millions) 
 
1.390 
 
6.514 
 
-25.350 
 
109.298 
Net Contributions per Loop 
(in thousands) 
 
-0.215 
 
0.475 
 
-14.152 
 
10.060 
Average Revenue per Line 
(in tens) 
 
3.524 
 
0.465 
 
2.528 
 
4.588 
UNE Average Loop Rate 
(actual numbers) 
 
16.053 
 
4.325 
 
7.014 
 
28.295 
Alltel 
(market share) 
 
0.029 
 
0.054 
 
0 
 
1 
BellSouth 
(market share) 
 
0.204 
 
0.359 
 
0 
 
1 
SBC 
(market share) 
 
0.195 
 
0.336 
 
0 
 
1 
Sprint 
(market share) 
 
0.041 
 
0.085 
 
0 
 
1 
Qwest 
(market share) 
 
0.204 
 
0.374 
 
0 
 
1 
Verizon 
(market share) 
 
0.186 
 
0.309 
 
0 
 
1 
Small Carriers 
(market share) 
 
0.141 
 
0.320 
 
0 
 
1 
Cellular Carriers 
(actual numbers) 
 
10.042 
 
3.152 
 
4 
 
18 
Population per Square Mile 
(in thousands) 
 
0.216 
 
1.430 
 
0.001 
 
52.419 
Median Household Income 
(in thousands) 
 
35.328 
 
8.852 
 
9.333 
 
82.929 
Median Age 
(actual numbers) 
 
37.354 
 
4.004 
 
20.125 
 
58.686 
Assistance 
(Percent of Households) 2.963 1.960 0 49.013 
Flexible Regulation 
(= 1 if Yes; 0 if No) 
 
0.508 
 
0.500 
 
0 
 
1 
PSC Appointed 
(= 1 if Yes; 0 if No) 
 
0.695 
 
0.461 
 
0 
 
1 
Municipal Ban 
(=1 if Restrictions; 0 otherwise) 0.050 0.217 0 1 
Table 3. Two-stage least squares estimates for entry per county and per study area 
 
 
  Regression Number            1               2            3              4             5             6  
  Dependant Variable      Entrants per County          Entrants per Study Area 
 
  Net Contributions  0.247***    0.531***          0.990***     1.06*** 
    (0.08)     (0.01 )       (0.26)        (0.28) 
  Net Contributions per Loop             0.020***    0.036**  
                (0.01)    (0.02) 
  Average UNE Rate  0.091***    0.147***       0.131***      0.258***    0.320*** 0.487*** 
    (0.02)     (0.02)         (0.02)      (0.09)       (0.10) (0.18) 
  Alltel         -3.146***           -6.705 -7.905 
         (0.69)            (5.03) (7.73) 
  BellSouth        -0.720        3.745***           2.283 -4.916 
         (0.52)        (0.77)           (3.72) (5.40) 
  SBC         -1.640**     5.068***           1.635 7.656 
         (0.52)        (0.94)           (3.33) (5.31) 
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  Sprint               2.839*** 
               (0.79) 
  Qwest         -1.916***    5.455***           -0.175 1.634 
         (0.51)        (1.07)           (3.25) (4.98) 
  Verizon        -2.400***    3.541***           1.833 -5.725 
          (0.58)        (0.73)           (3.84) (5.05) 
  Small Carriers       -1.104**     4.343***           0.696 1.574 
         (0.48)        (0.87)           (3.44) (5.25) 
  Cellular Carriers  -0.026      -0.159***    0.025 
    (0.03)     (0.04)        (0.02) 
  Population per Square Mile 0.518***    0.449***     0.609***      10.850***   7.908*** 43.907*** 
    (0.03)     (0.03)        (0.03)      (0.87)        (1.02) (2.24) 
  Median Household Income 0.009***    0.479***      0.474***      13.357**    9.840 4.180*** 
    (0.001)     (0.09)        (0.11)      (6.56)        (7.64) (1.53) 
  Median Age   -0.042***  -0.029***    -0.024*      -0.057       -0.050  -0.247 
    (0.01)     (0.01)        (0.02)      (0.10)        (0.10) (0.15) 
  Assistance   0.142***         0.121***    0.195*** 
    (0.028)    (0.028)      (0.03) 
  Flexible Regulation  -0.086     -0.251***   -0.473***      0.164         0.003 0.470 
    (0.06)     (0.10)        (0.14)      (0.62)        (0.73) (1.04) 
  PSC Appointed  -0.060     -0.038        0.078      -0.234       -0.231 -1.002 
    (0.09)     (0.11)        (0.12)      (0.72)        (0.79) (1.23) 
  Muniban   0.004     0.290*       -0.004*      -0.042       -0.024 -0.096** 
    (0.14)     (0.161)       (0.01)      (0.03)        (0.03) (0.04) 
  Number of Observations 11,900     11,900       11,873      2,002         2,002 1,999 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are shown by *, 
**, and ***, respectively. 
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Table 4. Fixed-effect estimates for entry 
 
 
Regression Number       (1)     (2)      (3) 
 
 
Net Positive Indicator (by County)  -1.288  -10.863 -26.261 
(2,028 Observations)    (2.39)  (18.59)  (203.78) 
 
Net Positive Indicator (by Study Area) 4.522  3.898  13.902*** 
(2,002 Observations)    (4.57)  (3.85)  (3.06) 
 
Net Positive Indicator (by State)  30.404*** 23.587* 23.087 
(190 Observations)    (11.81)  (15.70)  (21.20) 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are shown by *, 
**, and ***, respectively. 
 
Specification 1 uses Net Contributions and does not include incumbents; specification 2 uses Net Contributions and 
includes incumbents; specification 3 uses Net Contributions per Loop and includes incumbents.  
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Appendix 
The model is a homogenous good duopoly competition model in which 
telecommunications providers simultaneously and independently choose whether to operate in a 
particular geographic area. For simplicity, suppose there are two areas, a low cost area (L) and a 
high cost area (H). There are two potential providers, an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E). 
Providers are assumed to be equal in operating costs so that CIk(θ) = CEk(θ) ∀ θ, k ∈{L, H}. 
Then C(θik) = [β + ciqik(θik)] where ciqik > 0 is provider i's marginal cost of serving qik customers 
θik  for all k ∈{L, H} and all i ∈{I, E}. β is the fixed cost of operating in an area. Providers 
compete for customers through price only. The total number of potential customers providers 
compete for in each county k is given by nk  = (qik + qjk), k ∈{L, H}. All potential customers 
enroll with one (and only one) provider, and choose the low-price provider. Each provider 
contributes a portion of its revenue to a universal service fund. The incumbent provider receives 
a subsidy for operating in a high cost area. For simplicity, assume the entrant does not receive a 
subsidy (this assumption mirrors the majority of cases in the US; without it, the dilemma 
disappears as both providers are essentially equal). The subsidy Ŝ ∈ [S,S] is a payment from the 
USF to the incumbent operating in a high cost area. In addition to the subsidy, providers earn 
revenue as indicated in Section 3 of the paper. Let Rik be the exogenously determined revenue to 
provider i, i = ∈{I, E} in area k, k ∈{L, H}.  
 
Lemma 1: The incumbent will earn zero profit if the entrant operates in the low cost area (i.e., 
qIL = 0 and qEL = nL ; and qIH = nH and qEH = 0) without the USF.  
 
Without the USF,  [RIL – CIL (θ)]nL = 0  since RILnL = α−1
A nL  and α−1
A  > α−1
L .  At the same 
time, [RIH – CIH (θ)]nH = 0, since RIk = α−1
A  which by definition just covers cost. The 
incumbent therefore has no incentive to operate without the USF, but is required to do so by the 
carrier of last resort obligations.  
 
Lemma 2: An appropriate subsidy will incorporate funds to offset the cost of competition in the 
low cost area in addition to offsetting the cost of operating in the high cost area.  
 
With the USF, the incumbent faces the following profit condition:  
[RILβ Ŝ - CIL (θ)]½nL + [RIH (1-β) Ŝ - CIH (θ)]nH ≥ 0. This allows the incumbent to earn non-
negative profit operating in both the low and high cost areas while the entrant operates in the low 
cost area. Hypothesis 1 indicates that there will be less entry in high-cost dominated study areas; 
however, under the USF this should not be the case. By definition, the subsidy should make 
operating in the high cost area commercially viable,1 and should ensure the policy is 
competitively neutral for the incumbent and entrant given that most entrants operate only in low 
cost areas. This implies that if Ŝ is optimal the following condition applies: 
ΠIL,H = [RILβ Ŝ - CIL(θ)]½nL + [RIH (1-β) Ŝ - CIH(θ)]nH = [REL – CEL(θ)]½nL = ΠEL (1) 
Solving for Ŝ we find: 
Ŝ  =   CIH  (2) 
 RIH(1 - β) 
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1 If we assume that the subsidy is appropriately determined, then the entrant has an incentive to apply for eligible 
telecommunications carrier status that enables it to receive the high-cost subsidy too. In reality most entrants do not 
apply for ETC status; we rely on revealed preference theory to assert that the subsidy must not be enough to make 
entry commercially viable. 
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For the subsidy to establish a neutral competitive study area, it must be set based on the 
incumbent’s cost of operating in the high cost area given the revenue received in that area and 
the portion of the subsidy that must be transferred to compete in the low cost area.  
Figure 1. Net contributions by local loop into the Universal Service Fund, by state, 2004 
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